America’s World Role: An Imperial Burden or an Empire in the Fine Old British Tradition?

Their motivations are similar. Both have been trading rather than military empires – like Athens rather than Sparta, like Venice or Carthage rather than Prussia. If they had a single textbook, it would be Adam Smith, not Machiavelli nor Marx. Indeed, it is no mere coincidence that 1776 marks the publication of Smith’s Wealth of Nations, Gibbons’ Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, and the U.S. Declaration of Independence. The U.S. may have retained more of the intellectual imprint of the British 18th century than Britain itself. Both the British and American empires have responded to circumstances, and been shaped by happenings rather than intentions. Britain stumbled into empire and so has the United States.

In the recent struggle in the Middle East, the continuity of the Anglo-Saxon approach to imperialism remains obvious. As the U.S. now travels the same territory that Britain covered in the first half of the 20th century, it meets the same problems of oil, Islam, and Arab nationalism. Ever since George Washington warned of foreign entanglements, the notion of empire has been treated as America’s permanent temptation and its potential nemesis.

Yet, what word but “empire” describes the awesome thing America has become? It leads the world in all dimensions of power – military, economic, scientific, and cultural. It is the only nation that polices the world through five global military commands, maintains more than a million men and women at arms on four continents, deploys carrier battle groups on watch in every ocean, guarantees the survival of countries from Israel to South Korea, drives the wheels of global trade and commerce, and seeks to infuse the world with its own dreams and desires.

Iraq lays bare the realities of America’s new role. It commits the U.S. to become the guarantor of peace, stability, democratization, and oil supplies in a combustible region of Islamic peoples stretching from Egypt to Afghanistan. A role once played by the Ottoman Empire, then by the French, and then the British – all painfully. Will American neo-imperialism fare better?

The ever-present danger of overstretch looms. A characteristic delusion of imperial power is to confuse global power with global domination. The Americans may have the former, but can they count on always having the latter? The more they try to rebuild each failed state or appease each anti-American hatred, the more they expose themselves to the overreach that eventually undermined the classical empires of old. Al Qaeda will surely strike a busy and overextended empire in the back.

Vice President Richard Cheney viewed Iraq as a perfect opportunity to prove the “Rumsfeld doctrine” of low-manpower, shock-and-awe aerial warfare, without any need for the U.S. to win allies or for the military to engage in “state-building” tasks.

To be an imperial power today calls for more than the exercise of power. We now know the role requires a judicious mix of force and politics, and, in particular, coalitions of willing nations. Yet Britain is the sole nation with which the U.S. has a trusting relationship on such matters as nuclear deterrent capability, and electronics and signals information. If victories remain elusive, then brains, notably in the exercise of intelligence, will be more important than brawn. The U.S. has close ties with Germany and Japan, but what of the more active cooperation with France and Spain?

The traditional theory suggests that the rise of any imperial power automatically generates counter-alliances. As a result, the dominant power redoubles its efforts to counter the new alliance, until eventually the empire becomes overstretched and collapses. Will the U.S. be the exception and remain immune from history’s harms? Or will its imperial destiny be the same as the other empires: hubris followed by defeat?

Despite such warnings, neo-imperialists believe America is exceptional because it is a democracy and harbors no lust for territorial gain, but offers instead an attractive imperium. There need be, therefore, no counterbalancing activity. Though, with hindsight, it was obviously a mistake to think that the Middle East wanted democracy. There are also other grounds for questioning such early optimism. First, as we learned on September 11, 2001, absolute military security does not exist. Second, the U.S. economy moves on an unsustainable track that has undermined American economic sovereignty. It is not just the military debacle in Iraq and the geopolitical setbacks suffered by American diplomacy. In some ways, more troubling are the indicators of economic underperformance; the reliance on foreign borrowing; the loss of Wall Street’s global dominance in financial services to the city of London; and the dollar falling to record lows.

Third, according to former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, attending the NATO summit in Latvia in late 2006, America’s policy in Iraq has damaged its stature on the world stage. Fourth, America remains militarily vulnerable, despite its overwhelming power, because its primary enemy is not a state, susceptible to deterrence, influence, and coercion. Instead, that opponent is a resurgent, radical Islam. Fifth, at such a crucial time, many countries seek to counterbalance U.S. power. This can be seen quite clearly at the United Nations and in the renewed ties between Russia and China. On the other hand, America’s rapprochement with India is directed at the issue of China.

Is the growth in the military budget a pointer, merely reflecting China’s growing wealth and prestige? But why missiles with a range to hit Japan? Japan’s relations with China are much improved in the shadow of historical grudges. Japan’s new prime minister broke the ice with a trip to Beijing. But the Sea of Japan remains a very dangerous place. In theory, the U.S. Sixth Fleet polices the region. Yet the Japanese worry whether or not a weakened, post-Iraq America will stand by them if and when the storm comes. Article 9 of Japan’s pacifist constitution restricts the country to pure self-defense on its own territory. Not for much longer. Are we about to witness an arms race between the two countries holding the greatest stashes of reserves in the world? China has 1,000 billion dollars; Japan has 915 billion dollars.

Like the emergence of Germany in the 19th century and of America in the 20th century, China’s rapid rise to superpower status generates as much fear as admiration. In a new book about China, David Lampton of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University argues that nations define their goals using three means: coercion, material inducement, or intellectual motivation. Put more bluntly, that means guns, money, and ideas. How China blends the three, and how America and Japan perceive the process, will do more than anything to shape the future course of Asia and beyond. What of China’s relations with Asia – its own backyard? President Hu Jintao and the rest of the Chinese “fourth-generation” leadership seek to soothe neighbors – even Taiwan – by emphasizing money and ideas over guns. Suspicions remain, for Chinese intentions remain deeply ambiguous.

Passing on the lessons of history to a younger, more nationalistic generation is China’s “big problem,” says Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s elder statesman. The same thing is happening in Japan, where a new generation emerges without the postwar hang-ups about defeat. It is not just America’s allies such as Japan and Taiwan that want the U.S. to stick around for a long while yet. The Association of South East Asian Nations also needs America to balance China. Singapore recently signed an agreement allowing American forces greater access, Indonesia and America have resumed bilateral military contacts, and Vietnam wants to forge a strategic alliance with its former enemy.

Finally, many now ask questions about the deeper needs of the U.S. and about its purpose – John Thornton, joint CEO of Goldman Sachs, for one. In his reported words, “The absence of meaning will catch up with America unless we are careful.” At some point, he goes on, the U.S. must shift from success to significance. Otherwise, life becomes pointless and unfulfilling. In their day, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Rome, Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire, Spain, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union stood as superpowers. Today, they either no longer exist or have very limited influence on the world stage. Can the U.S. – the world’s only military and economic superpower – avoid that fate by becoming also a moral superpower?

Our world increasingly emerges as a divided planet of the very wealthy and the very poor. The U.N. Food & Agriculture Organization has just reported that the world’s undernourished population grows annually by five million. In his encyclical, The Development of Peoples, John Paul II challenged all rich nations to wage war on misery, to promote the common good of humanity by promoting human and spiritual progress. To wage war on misery. What a challenge for the U.S.!

Sir Patrick Duffy, PhD, is a scholar-in-residence in APU’s School of Business and Management.